Anna Muraveva
"Overview of Russia’s Foreign Policy Towards Its CIS Neighbors"
Introduction
In recent years Russia has been viewed as a “resurgent state” because of its economic growth and increased involvement in global affairs. At the same time Russia’s political elite has started to put special emphasis on relations with the former Soviet republics, considering them the main part of Russia’s “sphere of influence.” These now-independent countries that made up the USSR are to varying degrees members of the Commonwealth of Independent States or CIS.
The subject of Russia’s foreign policy making has been widely discussed in the mass media as well as in the literature that specializes in political science and international relations. At the same time, the existence of abundant information and analyses on the subject of Russia’s foreign policy toward its “near abroad” does not make it easier to understand the current situation, since most existing papers offer either a pro-Western or pro-Russian position on the issue. Therefore, the purpose of this review is an attempt to give a balanced overview of Russian foreign policy in the CIS region.
In the analysis of Russia’s foreign policy, Western authors and politicians exclusively blame Russia’s imperial ambitions as they interpret an appearance of Russia’s so-called “sphere of influence” and for this reason deny Russia the “privilege” of promoting its interests in the CIS. However, this approach appears to be rather one-sided, since it neglects economic interconnections, common transport routes and cultural ties, inherited by the CIS countries from the Soviet Union. All these factors facilitate joint business projects and allow Russia more effective policy-making.
The other important reason for Russia’s government to give its foreign interests a priority in the CIS region is the possibility of Western institutional enlargement that could pose a threat to Russia’s national security. No state, according to Medvedev, could be “pleased about having the representatives of a military bloc (NATO) to which it doesn’t belong coming close to its borders” Therefore, Russia’s top priority is “keeping pro-Western blocks out of Russia’s border” and, simultaneously, to promote its own political and economic influence in the CIS (6).
The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
The CIS was founded on December 8, 1991, right after the breakup of the Soviet Union in order to guarantee a smoother transition of the former republics of the USSR into independent states. The political agreement was achieved relatively swiftly, yet at that point it was premature to discuss the complete separation of the newly independent states. “The collapse of the Soviet Union brought about political disintegration, but did little to interrupt established Soviet-era patterns of interaction, from industrial trade to rail travel and ground transportation” (1). However, the political disintegration led to a number of ethnic conflicts and territorial disputes in the CIS states, some of which remain unresolved to this day.
At first, the importance of the CIS agreement was greatly diminished by the leaders of the newly-emerged independent states, who were focused more on the development of their governments and on building new political institutes than establishing economic cooperation with each other. Soon, the majority of them realized that, despite its poor effectiveness, the CIS could still be considered a valuable tool for the economic and cultural interaction among the post-Soviet states.
The main ideas underpinning the foreign policy of the Russian Federation
In the 1990s Russia’s foreign policy had two opposing vectors that defined Russia’s attitude toward the CIS states. The first one allowed for the geopolitical and economical pluralism of the newly independent states in the CIS. This approach to Russia’s foreign policy towards CIS was discarded, even though it was the most consistent with Russia’s vulnerable world position and scarce economical resources in the 1990s. The second tendency was characterized by geopolitical integration of the CIS under the guideline of Russia and became dominant at the time, reflecting the imperial ambitions of the former superpower.
The surge in energy prices under Putin’s presidency led to the enforcement of the latter approach within Russia’s foreign policy approach in the 2000s. The foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation, which is currently in force, was approved and signed by President Medvedev in 2008. The concept is based on the Foreign policy doctrine adopted in 2000 during Putin’s presidency, and is considered its continuation. The main objective of Russian Foreign Policy concept is “to ensure reliable security of the country, to preserve and strengthen its sovereignty and territorial integrity, to achieve firm and prestigious positions in the world community, most fully consistent with the interests of the Russian Federation as a great power, as one of the most influential centers of the modern world” (5).
In order to achieve this objective the Russian government seeks “to form a good-neighbor belt along the perimeter of Russia's borders, to promote the elimination of the existing and prevent the emergence of potential hotbeds of tension and conflicts in regions adjacent to the Russian Federation” (5). Furthermore, Russia states clearly that it has privileged interests in developing cooperation and good-neighborly relations with the members of the CIS.
Russian policy towards its CIS neighbors
Central Asia Region
In recent decades Russia’s policies towards Central Asian states have pursued one main goal. Russia sought to strengthen economic ties with those countries through participation in joined energy projects and direct investments in their infrastructure, and, consequently, was able to keep the Central Asian region “in pro-Russian integration structures and to push all alternative organizations out of the region” (3). Also, in order to promote stable and secure economic relations, Russia sought to guarantee security in Central Asia by fighting terrorism, Islamic extremism and limiting the drug trade (3).
Using its economic and political dominance, Russia was able to successfully inhibit the development of alternative routes for Central Asian oil and gas. For instance, since 1990s European countries have been planning to diversify their gas transit routes and considered a “Nabucco” pipeline from Turkmenistan through Turkey into the EU; however, Russia was first to complete its “Blue Stream” pipeline under the Black Sea, which made Turkey consider the European project unnecessary (4). At about the same time, Russia blocked the construction of the trans-Caspian oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to Azerbaijan, which was intended to bypass Russia. However, this status quo might change when new actors, such as China, will show “more and more appetite for Central Asia energy resources.”
According to the experts, Russia achieved the majority of its foreign policy goals in the Asian region; however, most of these achievements are fragile, since the Russian government has not elaborated any long-term strategy with the Asian members of the CIS, and it does not have enough economic resources to support its political influence. In addition, the element of destabilization in the region is introduced by the lack of coordination between different pro-Russian projects of integration as well as between its alternatives (3).
South Caucasus (Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia)
The most complicated relations in the region are with Georgia. After the election of the pro-Western president Mikhail Saakashvili in 2003, who, from his first days in office, took the direction of seeking NATO membership, the relations between Russia and Georgia started to deteriorate. President Saakashvili was eager to swiftly resolve all of the ongoing territorial conflicts by bringing the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia under Georgian control to qualify for the NATO membership that Russia vigorously opposed. However, the negotiations over the status of the separatist regions, which were accompanied by provocative military incidents from both sides, came into deadlock in the late 2000s.
These tensions culminated in August 2008 when Georgian forces started a large-scale military operation in South Ossetia. Russia responded by sending troops to Georgia to back Russian peacekeepers that came under fire in Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia, and “to protect the rights and interests of Russian citizens and compatriots abroad on the basis of international law and operative bilateral agreements” (5), since many South Ossetian people had Russian citizenship. Later, the European commission investigated the war between Russia and Georgia and found the actions of the Russian Federation legitimate but eventually disproportionate, noting the fact that Russian troops moved outside of the separatist regions into the Georgian territory and seized Georgian towns Gori and Poti. Finally, the European Union intervened, brokering a cease-fire agreement with President Medvedev. In protest, Georgia withdrew from the CIS, while the Russian parliament recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states. Nowadays, there has been no diplomatic relations between Russia and Georgia and no sign of improvement, since both countries have mutually exclusive goals.
The other two Caucasian states – Azerbaijan and Armenia - have been Russia’s close economic partners in the last decade. Nevertheless, they both implicitly backed Georgia’s territorial integrity, due to their close economic ties with Georgia in the energy sphere, and were not interested in any prolonged armed conflict in Georgia, since “it would disrupt all its supply routes” (8). This clearly indicated that they put their economic interests first, and that they possess an opportunistic approach in their foreign policy strategy.
Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova
Russia traditionally believed in its close historical and ethnic ties with Ukraine and Belarus, and for this reason used this approach as a basis for building its foreign policy towards these countries and aspiring for a good neighboring relationship. After the collapse of the Soviet Union the interactions between Russia and Ukraine remained relatively stable and warm up to 2004, when, in the course of the Orange revolution, President Yuschenko took the path towards Europe and turned his back on Russia. The newly-elected Ukrainian president’s aspirations for joining the NATO-alliance, together with the dispute over payments for gas supplies, made President Putin remove subsidies and gradually bring gas prices for Ukraine to the free-market level. That resulted in late payments by Ukraine and finally culminated in disruption of gas supplies to European countries in January 2009. In the course of the disputes with Ukraine over gas prices Russia was widely accused by the EU and the US in using energy to put political pressure on President Yuschenko’s regime. However, eventually the EU analysts acknowledged that “Russia has legitimate commercial reasons for raising the prices it charges its customers for oil and gas” (7).
Ukraine is the key transit route of Russian gas to the EU, accounting for 80% of the total volume of gas. Since Russia has become “fearful of being branded an unreliable supplier of energy by customers in Germany, France and other countries in Western Europe” (4), Russia has started seeking alternative transit routes to Europe, bypassing Ukraine. In the late 2000s the Russian government greatly succeeded in this goal by undermining the US and European-backed projects and accelerating the construction of the South and North stream projects.
In its turn, Russia’s special ties with Belarus were undermined by ongoing negotiations over the Russian-Belarus Union Treaty. According to the foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation, since 2000 it was a priority task for Russia “to strengthen the Union of Belarus and Russia as the highest, at this stage, form of integration of two sovereign states.” (citation?) However, this year discord over Russian financial aid to Belarus resulted in the President’s Lukashenka request for credit from Western countries instead. Moreover, Russia’s summer ban on milk imports from Belarus made the situation even tenser, and the relations between the two former allies has cooled down.
Russian foreign policy towards Moldova is the most evident example of how Russia achieves its aims by using economic pressure. Moldova and Russia have “their own frozen conflict from Soviet days: the Russian-supported and heavily armed enslave of Trans-Dniester” (8). Moldovan president Voronin tried to pursue Russia’s government to remove Russian peacekeepers and to gain control over the region; however, the treaty of increasing gas prices and the embargo on Moldovan wine imports to Russia severely restrained the Moldovan government’s ability to stand their ground.
Conclusion
A brief analysis of Russian policy towards CIS states shows that Russia has emerged as a global player that is capable of pursuing its economic and political interests. Most of the aims identified in Russia’s foreign policy concept were accomplished. However, many political observers (7) \agree on the fact that in order to maintain this global role, Russia should appeal to its “domestic societal issues,” and to address numerous internal problems such as outdated infrastructure, a weak military and a \substandard public health system, along with the need to deal with a corrupt bureaucracy.
“Russian foreign policy remains contradictory, reflecting the lack of clear definition of what the country’s more concrete interests might be beyond this broad consensus” (6). The instability of Russia’s role as a leading power in the CIS has become apparent. Russia’s policy has turned into a set of accidental decisions reacting to certain short-term challenges or opportunities. (Andrey Kazantsev (2008, Europe-Asia Studies)
Opportunistic approach is not acceptable for Russia to achieve a success in its foreign policy
Other important players that have their interests in CIS (The US, EU, China, India, Iran)
Continuity of Foreign policy in the CIS region under the president Medvedev. Political experts from Emerging Europe Monitor have a view that “Moscow will continue to make efforts to Perspectives for the Future enhance its position within the Commonwealth of independent States while also taking a more proactive position on global issues” (10)
List of References
(2). History of Russia: XX-the beginning of XXI,” Moscow, Eksmo, 2006 (“Istoriya Rossii: XX-nachala XXI veka” pod redakciej L.V.Milova, Moskva, Eksmo, 2006)
(3). Andrey Kazantsev “Russian Policy in Central Asia and the Caspian Sea Region,” Europe-Asia Studies Vol. 60, No. 6, August 2008.
(4). Lindsay Wright “Pipeline Politics: Russia’s Natural Gas Diplomacy,” Pipeline and Gas Journal /August 2009/ www.pgjonline.com
(5). The Foreign Policy conception of Russian Federation. 2000.
(6). Andrew Monaghan “An enemy at the gates” or “from victory to victory?” Russian Foreign Policy. International Affairs, 84: 4(2008)
(7). Angela E. Stent “Restoration and Revolution in Putin’s Foreign Policy,” Europe-Asia Studies Vol. 60, No. 6, August 2008.
(9). Janusz Bugajski “Expanding Eurasia: Russia’s European ambitions,” CSIS
(10). “Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Pragmatism.” Russia and CIS. Emerging Europe Monitor Vol.12, Issue 9, September 2008
(11) Mark Kramer “Russian Policy toward the Commonwealth of Independent State: Recent Trends and Future Prospects” Problems of Post-Communism, vol.55, no. 6, November/December 2008, pp. 3-19.
(12) Andrey Makarychev “Russia, NATO, and the “Color Revolutions” (Discursive Traps), Russian Politics and Law, vol. 47, no. 5, September-October 2009, pp. 40-51.
Anna Muraveva is researcher for Provocate and a native of Saratov, on the Volga River in southern Russia. Her Master’s thesis in Sociology at Saratov State University used opinion surveys to illuminate the politics of ethnic self-identification in Russia as it underwent rapid transformation. Courses Anna took from Stanford — “International Conflict Management” and “Security, Civil Liberties and Terrorism” — drew her to a serious study of Russian foreign policy.
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